

































Ukraine in the War as they would get legitimate rights to manage the occupied 
territories. Hence, to find a common ground is less likely in such a situation. So, 
Ukraine and Western World should focus on finding ways to convince or not give 
any choice to Russia as to only stop the war. 
The War in Donbas is a wound on Ukrainian integrity and even after solving it, 
it would need years of healing. Unfortunately, even after 7 years, the common ground 
was not found, and it seems like it will be able to be done even in the nearest future. 
Separatists and their leaders will not be able to reach a compromise if they would not 
get such a command from Russia’s president. Ukrainian allies do everything possible 
to assist Ukraine but still, the war is ongoing. The only way that Ukraine has now is 
to fight for its integrity domestically and internationally with a hope that economic 
and political sanctions will work and its allies will give a hand then the country 
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It looks obvious, that a debate about information wars (as well as wars in 
general) should not disappear from the current research agenda. Internal and external 
political reasons make military topics periodically appear and vanish.  
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Their current rise is associated with two new circumstances. 
Firstly, a romantic thesis «We simply need to stop shooting» has crashed.  
A withdrawal of a three hostile Ukrainian TV channels' beneficiary turned 
TKG from being an active instrument of legitimate hostile planning into a 
unimportant propaganda tool. An available niche of information attacks immediately 
had been filled with the Russian political hysterics and a demonstration of the 
ORDLO's military capabilities. 
Those activities, so far, have served as a test for the Russian ambitions' 
adaptation to new American political realities. 
Secondly, the above-mentioned US foreign policy circumstances (an 
advancement towards EU and Eastern European issues) forced the Ukrainian 
authorities to become unexpectedly bold in reforming their own agendas. 
We witness an increased number of conflicts among the official Ukrainian 
politicians with some odious representatives of a «shadow state». Ukrainian oligarchs 
during all these years of war with Russia were ready to generously finance any 
patriotic masquerade that camouflaged their business with the enemy. 
A decrease in those impacts on the state policy, which argued a chance to 
become a really national one, has created fundamentally new societal stresses. Some 
new «communicative gaps» have appeared in an old corruption body. Political 
traumas of that kind of changes have a nature of open cognitive wounds, which have 
been always a target of the hostile special services attacks.  
For example, a NATO doctrine with a relevant digital code STANAG and 
supplements for the NATO participating countries in an AJP format is close to what 
we interpret as a «statute». What we proudly call a «doctrine» reminds a «strategy» 
or rather a «vision». If we talk about information wars, it is important to remember 
that a segment of Strategic NATO Communications includes more than a dozen of 
mutually linked instruments of information influence. 
Those directions have its methodological support, including doctrines. The 
doctrines are associated with other documents, which are called IRC (Informational 
Related Capabilities). They include the specifics depending on forces specializations. 
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Navy, aviation or land troops and their informational operations have a common 
basis, but different tactical recommendations. Generalizations of processes under an 
information war slogan give a unique opportunity for journalists and bloggers to 
advertise themselves. The Ukrainian society has learned to widely use a stylish word 
«fake», which does not really change a lot. It is generally a useful phenomenon, since 
a state propaganda narrative does not exist. 
A subject of information influences is not limited to the army. Special services 
specifics in counter-acting hostile information influences are more complicated. 
After two years of discussion in early 2017, NATO has been established a 
combined intelligence and security agency. However, each NATO member primarily 
protects its own national interests and own intelligence within any alliance. There are 
more stable communities, such as the union of five English-speaking countries called 
«Five Eyes» [2]. Due to the existence of a common enemy, there are less stable 
situational units as well. In 2004 President Bush signed the law on establishment of 
the US National Intelligence, which has a function of a political regulator of the 
intelligence community within its 16 subjects. Information influences in this area are 
pragmatic and therefore more effective. However, inter-agency conflicts of interest 
did exist in this sphere as well. 
Vulnerability 
Russian information attacks in different directions have been using various 
techniques with two strategic goals [1]. 
The first goal is economical.  
A task is to draw Ukraine into an exhausting information arms race/IAR. 
Russia, as a country with still a strong economic potential, tries to make Ukraine to 
participate in an IAR competition that requires money, time and research. It distracts 
an attention of Ukrainians from other important internal problems. A Ukrainian side, 
in principle, has agreed lively, because it is a pleasant option of budgeting without 
any consequences: «You know, we fight the hybrid war». 
 The second goal is cognitive. 
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A cognitive system/cognitive structure (from a Latin word «cognition», 
«knowledge») is a system of personal knowledge which is formed as a result of 
character formation, education, training, observation and reflection of the 
surrounding world. This system includes a set of decision-making on how to act in a 
certain situation trying to avoid contradictions. 
A cognitive goal means a creation of a strong and irreversible set of semantic 
influences on the human psyche in the occupied regions to acquire a new identity 
which, consequently, changes social behavior. In ORDLO during seven years we 
have already received a kind of our own "German Democratic Republic" with its own 
"Stasi" under a FSB/GRU control. 
The first stage of that influence is a restriction of normal communication and, 
in general, a restriction of any access to information or so-called «deprivation». 
There is a mental state when a person cannot satisfy basic mental needs for a 
long time. Circumstances of the Russian-Ukrainian war sharply reduce economic 
opportunities of people, their social prospects and suppress their vital plans. 
Deprivation creates a «negative pressure» on cognitive abilities of a person, 
causing imbalance and nervousness. Such a negative information pressure leads to 
search and acquisition of «other» information which (according to its Russian 
authors) is more relevant and useful. Not many are able to abandon an access to such 
«other» information, which is destructive in its core. Ukrainians are forced to 
participate in a surrounding communicative process, even if such a process is 
depressing and causes a complete distrust. 
It reminds the purchase of a low-quality buy eatable food. People realize that 
their current situation makes them to buy such food because they believe that they 
could buy something better later. But next time never comes. A goal of such 
influences is to create a different context of false feelings, which lead to certain 
behavior.   
Consequently, a real goal of informational influences is the change of behavior. 
If a person continues to follow his/her own ideology or faith, but acting (or vice 
versa, hiding) under the influence of hostile informational operation, it is called an 
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effective informational campaign. People under its influence are called «useful 
idiots». Their intensification or omission of certain acts at the right time is the task of 
the enemy's special operations. 
Informational spectrum of vulnerabilities and their cognitive segment are a 
current «theater of hostilities» in the proxy war with Russia. A cognitive system of 
responsible decision-makers under such influences will turn them into «useful 
idiots». They will make sincere mistakes. A social process will change its trajectory 
towards a favorable for the enemy direction. 
Methods of «convincing influence» are known since the late 40's including the 
models developed by Lasswell, Shannon–Weaver, Osgood–Schramm, Latane and 
others. Those models do not receive an appropriate attention, because social 
procedures and processes are not easy to evaluate and model. 
In order to achieve effectiveness of influence sometimes certain actions need to 
be prolonged in time before they bring any result. Modeling of social influence 
factors requires interdisciplinary approaches relating to informatics, marketing, 
political science, social psychology, etc. 
Ukrainian securities bureaucracy, as any other, is not creative. In addition, as 
all bureaucracies, it must be highly specialized. If a Ukrainian national security 
system aims to fight threats, it is necessary to take into account that a threat and 
vulnerability are not the same things. A threat is a person or an event that has a 
negative impact on potential valuable resources. Vulnerability is a quality of the 
resource or its environment, which allows to realize the threat. Dealing with 
vulnerabilities, we encounter a wall of a bureaucratic silence, because we cannot 
criticize ourselves. 
Our current problem of early risk prevention is in those kinds of risks that do 
not fall into a list of the respectable «official threats». Our security system, as well as 
the entire state system, remains within a framework of the Soviet administrative 
model. Some profound changes can only be made while being threatened by a 
deprivation of funding, both internal and external. 
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Americans after a tragedy of 9/11 adopted the Patriot Act to strengthen 
American national security by ensuring appropriate means necessary to stop and 
prevent terrorism (2001–2015). It is a voluminous and meaningful document. In 2002 
Bush signed the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA) [3], which had been updated 
several times in accordance with the actual challenges. Its action is extended until 
December 31, 2027. 
A separate exciting article could be written about the above-mentioned 
documents. A major thing that caused their appearance was an official recognition 
that the existing system of interaction among law enforcement, counter-intelligence 
and intelligence structures did not cope with threats of a new type. That happened in 
the US, where their defense budget is about sixteen times larger than the Russian one. 
Though those documents are not about money, but brains. 
On November 25, 2002 the American system responded to existing threats by 
an establishment of the National Security Department working with a civil segment. 
Its declared goal was to prepare, prevent and respond to domestic emergencies, in 
particular terrorism. 
A Ukrainian response to new information threats could be made in two ways. 
Administrative – a creation of new, modern type of institutions with a 
simultaneous elimination of the old ones. However, NABU/DBR/SAP (irrespective 
of their current activities) demonstrate a powerful resistance including legal and 
political problems which are on the way of reforms in Ukraine. 
The second way is an appeal for help from a society. More precisely, an appeal 
for partnership with a new and relevant legislative base including mutual obligations. 
A US system of civil outsourcing in their security sector has been very strong. After 
9/11 it was increased and had remained strong so far. Those are not our «public 
councils», but full-fledged civic-government partnerships. 
A contemporary cognitive war with the current Ukrainian archaic approaches 
to own security creates vulnerability of a completely new type. Media, civil society 
and by all means government structures are not able to prevent it.  
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We soon might experience new and unexpected Russian threats if our regular 
reforms continue to save our already insufficient national security budget and employ 
the same people for new jobs. Asymmetric and modern security measures in a 





1. Teperik D., Jermalavičius T., Senkivn G., Dubov D., Onyshchuk Y., Pokalchuk O., 
Samus M. (2018). A Route to National Resilience. Building. Whole-of-Society Security in Ukraine. 
URL: https://uploads.icds.ee/ICDS_Report_A_Route_oilience-Building- 
2. Gold J. The Five Eyes and Offensive Cyber Capabilities: Building a ‘Cyber Deterrence 
Initiative’. URL: https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2020/10/2020-Josh-Gold-Five-Eyes-and-Offensive-
Cyber-Capabilities.pdf 





Анастасія Іванченко,  
студентка Сумського державного університету 
 
РОСІЙСЬКА ІНФОДЕМІЯ: ФЕЙКИ ТА ПРОПАГАНДА 
 
Ми не просто боремося з епідемією, ми боремося з інфодемією 
Тедрос Аданом Гебреісус (Генеральний директор ВООЗ) 
 
Хто володіє інформацією, той володіє світом, тому в ХХІ столітті акцент 
із фізичних війн змістився на інформаційні та когнітивні. Вони дешевші та не 
вимагають людських жертв. І головне – систематично впливають на свідомість, 
а отже і на дії людини. Саме через це світові кризи стали майданчиком для 
маніпуляцій. Нестабільна ситуація дає шанс захопити владу над свідомістю 
мас. Інструментами маніпуляції та нав’язування наративів стали пропаганда, 
фейки та дезінформація.  
Особливістю сучасної пропаганди 2.0 є високий рівень креативності, яка 
основана на політичних технологіях [1]. Проте цього недостатньо, адже 
